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The Guns of Sicily
The 1st Canadian Divisional 
Artillery in Operation Husky
D A V I D  W.  G R E B S T A D
Abstract: Most studies on Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily, focus 
almost exclusively on the work of the manoeuvre elements with only 
perfunctory references to the men who provided the fire support. The story 
of the Canadian gunners that fought their way through Sicily has been 
woefully overlooked and needs to be told. Amongst the hills of Sicily, these 
Canadian gunners overcame inexperience, intense heat, forbidding terrain 
and a resilient enemy to develop the war-winning fire support formula that 
would later allow the Canadian Army to successfully fight its way through 
Italy and Northwest Europe.
O t h e r  t h a n  t h e  Dieppe raid, the campaign in Sicily was the first divisional-level combat operation conducted by the Canadian
Army during the Second World War. During this operation, the
future leaders of the Canadian Army in North-West Europe developed 
their combat experience and refined the fighting methods that 
would eventually lead them to victory.1 Any work that investigates 
Operation Husky focuses almost exclusively on the work of the 
manoeuvre element with only perfunctory references to the men who 
provided the fire support. The story of the gunners that fought their 
way through Sicily needs to be told. Amongst the hills of Sicily, these 
Canadian gunners developed the war-winning formula that would
1 Mark Zuehlke, Operation Husky: The Canadian Invasion of Sicily, July 10-August 
7, 1943 (Vancouver: Douglas and Macintyre, 2008), 2.
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allow the Canadian Army to fight its way through Italy and North­
West Europe. The intent of this article is to shed some light on the 
formidable efforts of the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery during the 
Sicilian campaign in the summer of 1943.
OVERVIEW
A review of the strategic impetus behind the invasion of Sicily, and 
the machinations that brought 1st Canadian Infantry Division into 
the operation late in the preparations, is beyond the scope of this 
article. It is sufficient to say that in the spring of 1943, 1st Canadian 
Division was ordered to conduct operations in Sicily commencing 
on 10 July 1943. The division’s commander royal artillery (c r a ) 
was Brigadier Bruce Matthews.2 34 The 1st Canadian Divisional 
Artillery for the operations in Sicily comprised A and C Batteries 
of the 1st Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (r c h a ),3 
the 2nd Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery (r c a ), the 3rd 
Field Regiment, r c a , the 1st Anti-Tank Regiment, r c a  and the 2nd 
Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, r c a . Also under command for the 
initial assault was the 142nd (Royal Devon Yeomanry) Regiment 
Self-Propelled (s p ), Royal Artillery (r a ) and the 93rd (Medium) 
Battery, r a .4 These two British artillery units proved invaluable to 
the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery. The Devons were equipped 
with Bishop 25-pounder self-propelled howitzers and thus had 
substantially greater mobility than the towed guns in the Canadian 
units. Furthermore, the long-range medium guns (5.5-inch howitzers) 
of 93rd (Medium) Battery could engage more distant targets than 
the 25-pounders.
The months leading up to the invasion were filled with intensive 
training and planning in Scotland. The division’s move to the
2 The CRA commanded all of the artillery assigned to the Division, including Field, 
Medium, Anti-Tank and Anti-Aircraft Artillery. It was the CR A’s duty to coordinate 
the fire of these units, along with supporting fire from naval vessels, close support 
aircraft and bombers, all with a view to facilitating the Division Commander’s 
manoeuvre plan.
3 1st Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery comprised three gun batteries 
-  A, B and C. Due to space limitations only A and C Battery deployed to Sicily. B 
Battery joined its parent regiment in Italy after the Sicilian campaign.
4 Headquarters Royal Canadian Artillery, 1st Canadian Division [HQ RCA 1st Cdn 
Div], Operation Order No.1, 6.
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Gunners drill in Canada before being sent overseas in 1940. [Laurier Centre for Military Strategic 
and Disarmament Studies]
Mediterranean involved a torturous voyage from Scotland to the 
south-eastern tip of Sicily. En route, three ships were sunk by a 
German U-boat resulting in vehicles, communication equipment, 
and artillery pieces being sent to the ocean floor. Despite this set 
back, the 1st Canadian Division landed on the beaches near Pachino 
during the early morning hours of 10 July 1943. The division formed 
the extreme left (western) flank of both 30 Corps and Eighth (UK) 
Army commanded by General Bernard Montgomery, and was flanked 
further to the West by Seventh (US) Army, under General George 
Patton. Together, Seventh and Eighth Armies comprised the Fifteenth 
Army Group commanded by British General Harold Alexander.
The division’s initial advances were rapid as the defenders 
withdrew northward under pressure towards more defensible ground, 
centered on the southern slope of Mount Etna. There the Germans 
and Italians exploited Sicily’s rugged terrain to its fullest. The result 
was several weeks of hard fighting during which the Canadians 
literally had to blast the defenders out of successive ridge lines. After 
about a month of intense combat, the Allies forced the Germans to 
evacuate the island and withdraw across the straits of Messina onto 
mainland Italy.
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UNBLOODED ARTILLERY
Almost all of the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery had been on the 
first “flight” of combat elements that left Canada in 1939. They 
spent the next three-and-half years conducting extensive training in 
the United Kingdom -  initially to repel the anticipated invasion of 
Britain by the Germans, and then in preparation for the eventual 
return to the continent. With the exception of a brief foray to France 
in 1940, the units did not see combat, and thus were completely 
“green” when they landed in Sicily. The Canadians were among 
British and American formations who had recently shattered the 
Axis forces in North Africa, proving themselves in combat and 
acquiring new tactics, techniques, and procedures.
The Canadian Army that arrived in England in 1939 was trained 
to fight a war along the same lines as their British counterparts. 
The doctrine of the time spurned the terrors of attritional warfare 
that had dominated the First World War and featured a nearly 
blind commitment to breakthrough by manoeuvre.5 In the early 
years of the war, the key leaders of the British Army conducted 
exercises predicated on deep penetration and were dismissive of the 
requirement for concentrated fire support.6 This approach to battle 
survived the operational-level failures of France in 1940 and pervaded 
Allied thinking even up to the commencement of the North Africa 
Campaign. It was in the sands of Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia that the 
artillery would re-emerge as the predominant arm on the battlefield. 
Chased into Egypt by Rommel’s Afrika Korps, it was not until the 
British built up significant artillery that they were able to stop the 
German advance with massive artillery fires, and commence offensive 
operations. The Allied predilection for deep manoeuvre was replaced 
by a return to an artillery-based doctrine like that of the First World 
War, predicated on a deliberate assault behind barrages by massed 
artillery.7 This artillery-based doctrine that emerged from the deserts
5 John Mosier, The Blitzkrieg Myth (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 10.
6 Terry Copp, The Brigade: The Fifth Canadian Infantry Brigade in WWII 
(Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2007), 32.
7 Major-General (Retired) J.B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 2004), 297. While there were a number of derivations of 
barrages, in essence a barrage was a wall of artillery fire that would “lift” or move a 
prescribed rate in accordance with the estimated speed of advance of the attacking 
manoeuvre formations.
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A  Canadian anti-tank regiment training in England prior to the Sicily invasion. [Library and 
Archives Canada PA 142661]
of North Africa was quite foreign to the British -  and therefore, 
Canadian -  generals of 1942.8
The evolving doctrine forced a change in organization and 
attitude. Late 1942 and 1943 saw a wholesale centralization of artillery 
where previously doctrine had stressed decentralization. In the fall of 
1942, General Bernard Montgomery, commander of Eighth Army, 
ordered that “the Divisional C R A  [was to] have centralized command 
of their divisional artillery, which was to be used as a seventy-two- 
gun battery.”9 10In September 1942, in another step towards the 
centralization of fire support, the British Army created the first 
Army Group Royal Artillery (a g r a )10 in which medium and field 
regiments were brigaded. Although nominally an army-level asset, in 
practice the a g r a  was often allocated to a corps. Canada followed 
suit and created 1st Canadian a g r a  in October 1942. The ability to 
concentrate overwhelming fires that resulted from the creation of the 
a g r a s  was one of the major factors that led to final victory.11
8 Copp, The Brigade, 32.
9 Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, 306.
10 Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, 72.
11 G.W.L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada: A History of the Royal Regiment 
of Canadian Artillery, Volume II: 1919-1967 (Toronto : McClelland and Stewart, 
1972), 111.
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Although the 1st Canadian Division and its artillery had been 
training together for nearly three years, in the 12 months leading 
up to the invasion of Sicily the doctrine for the organization and 
employment of divisional artillery changed wholesale. As a result, the 
Canadian gunners under their c r a , Brigadier Bruce Matthews, found 
themselves racing to catch up.
ORDERS FOR AN INVASION
The spring of 1943 brought orders for the 1st Canadian Division, 
commanded by Major-General Guy Granville Simonds, to 
participate in Operation Husky and mission-specific training began 
on 1 May 1943, only seventy days before D-Day.12 Although they 
were still trying to familiarize themselves with the artillery-based 
doctrine that had emerged from the North Africa Campaign, the 
Canadian gunners’ training was further hampered by a large-scale 
change in their equipment. All of the 25-pounder howitzers were 
fitted with new muzzle-brakes, while the Field Artillery Tractors 
(f a t s ) that towed the guns were replaced by new four-wheel drive 
variants known as Quads. New wireless sets were also issued, and 
the anti-tank artillery regiment converted one troop per battery 
to the heavy new 17-pounder anti-tank guns.13 In an after-action 
review of the events leading up to the operation, Brigadier Matthews 
recalled that the major equipment changes “were a great problem 
to all units, and coupled with the hundreds of minor adjustments 
to equipment of all sorts, tended to make things rather chaotic and 
seriously affected training in all departments.”14 Despite the change 
in doctrine and equipment, the gunners successfully completed 
several weeks of intensive training in Scotland in preparation for 
the invasion. Training was facilitated by mentorship provided by 
an artillery veteran of the North Africa campaign, Eighth Arm y’s 
brigadier royal artillery ( b r a ) , Brigadier Meade E. Dennis. He, along
12 Originally the Division had been under the command of Major-General Harry 
Salmon. While travelling to Cairo for a coordination conference prior to Husky, 
General Salmon was killed in an air crash. General Simonds was commanding 2nd 
Canadian Division at the time, and was transferred to command of 1st Canadian 
Division to replace Salmon.
13 HQ RCA 1st Cdn Div, Summary of Events Leading Up to Operations by 1 Cdn Div, 3.
14 HQ RCA 1st Cdn Div, Summary of Events Leading Up to Operations by 1 Cdn Div, 3.
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A  Canadian anti-tank regiment 
training in England prior to the Sicily 
invasion. [Canadian Forces Photo ZK 572]
with other British veterans of North Africa, had been dispatched by 
Montgomery to assist the Canadians in preparing for combat.15
The first convoy of ships departed Scotland on 28 June 1943 with 
the remainder following at regular intervals.16 The last element of 
the Divisional Artillery, the 1st Regiment, r c h a , departed Gourrock 
Harbour aboard the s s  Arundel on 1 July. Tension must have been 
high amongst the members of the 1st Regiment as they were ordered 
to carry life preservers at all times and sleep fully clothed.17
As the gunners sailed away, the 1st Canadian Divisional 
Artillery’s war diarist noted contemplatively that “all ranks [watched] 
Scotland fade behind us and Ireland looming ahead. Most of us 
watched the same sight in reverse order three and a half years ago.”18 
Aboard the headquarters ship, the Hillary, Brigadier Matthews 
lectured the Divisional Artillery Headquarters on “Artillery Aspects 
of the Operation” and a Captain Arnold briefed the troops aboard
15 Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, Vol.II, 135.
16 War Diary [WD], 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery [1st Cdn Div Arty], 28 June 1943.
17 WD, 1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery [1 RCHA], 1 July 1943.
18 WD, 1st Cdn Div Arty, 28 June 1943.
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on elementary Italian.19 Amongst the other units of the Divisional 
Artillery, the routine consisted of lectures, physical training, and in 
the case of the 1st Regiment, r c h a  a route march aboard the ship.20 
Soon after the convoy entered the Mediterranean, the first tragedy of 
the Sicilian campaign struck the division. U-boats sank three ships 
-  the City of Venice, the St. Eseylt, and the Devis -  on 4 July.21 
While all units of the 1st Canadian Division suffered materially from 
this loss, the Divisional Artillery was particularly hard hit. It lost 
eight 17-pounder anti-tank guns, 10 25-pounder howitzers and six 
40 mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns, and almost all of the vehicles of 
the Divisional Artillery Headquarters, although Brigadier Matthews’ 
office caravan was spared.22 The preponderance of lost equipment 
came from the 3rd Field Regiment, r c a , and specifically 92 Battery. 
The 3rd Regiment’s diarist lamented that “it was rather a disastrous 
loss for the [Regiment] as G section lost all their wireless sets and one 
of our three [batteries] was practically eliminated before the operation 
had even started.”23 This exacerbated the existing shortages, as the 
division was already short of its normal complement of fire support 
assets. The 1st Regiment, r c h a  was left behind to join the Divisional 
Artillery on a later convoy, and when it deployed, it only brought two 
batteries.24 As a result of losing these vessels, 3rd Field Regiment was 
compelled to organize itself on a two - rather than three - battery 
basis.25 Likewise, 2nd Field Regiment lost an entire troop of personnel 
when their ship was torpedoed and they were taken to Algiers by a 
rescue ship, not to rejoin the regiment for seven weeks.26 Considering 
the importance of artillery support to the prevailing Allied doctrine 
after the North Africa campaign, the loss of these fire support assets 
was a major blow to the division’s ability to execute operations.
19 WD, 1st Cdn Div Arty, 2-3 July 1943.
20 WD, 1 RCHA, 5 July 1943.
21 WD, 1st Cdn Div Arty, 4 July 1943.
22 WD, 1st Cdn Div Arty, 5 July 1943.
23 WD, 3rd Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery [3 RCA], 1-9 July 1943.
24 Major G.D. Mitchell, Lieutenant-Colonel B.A. Reid, Lieutenant-Colonel W. 
Simcock, RCHA -  Right of the Line: An Anecdotal History of the Royal Canadian 
Horse Artillery from 1871 (Ottawa: RCHA History Committee, 1986), 95.
25 WD, 3 RCA, 1-9 July 1943.
26 Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, Vol.II, 139.
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AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT AND THE FIGHT INLAND
The fire support plan that Brigadier Matthews developed for the 
assault phase of the campaign was rather straightforward. As the 
schedule did not have batteries coming ashore until last light on 
D-Day, fire support for the amphibious assault was initially provided 
by naval gunfire. The organic artillery would be available to support 
operations once they had established themselves on shore.
Matthews’ plan for the assault phase decentralized the artillery in 
direct support of the two assault brigades, the 1st and 2nd Canadian 
Infantry Brigades. Each assaulting brigade could expect fire support 
from a battery and a half of self-propelled howitzers from the Devons, 
and a field regiment of towed 25-pounders.27 The first artillery gun 
groups scheduled to arrive on the beach came from the Devons, 
divided into two groups of a battery and a half each. The Devons were 
followed by the guns of the 2nd and 3rd Field Regiments, r c a  tasked 
to support 1st and 2nd Brigades, respectively.28 The 1st Regiment, 
r c h a  eventually came ashore on 13 July.29 Consistent with the lessons 
learned in North Africa and changes in doctrine that stressed the 
centralization of artillery, all fire units were ordered to deploy as close 
as possible to the inter-brigade boundary in order to facilitate their 
centralization under the c r a  after the assault phase was over.30 The 
1st Regiment, r c h a  would either land and be directed to an assembly 
area or fall under command of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade, 
depending on the situation at the time.31 32
Ammunition conservation was a grave concern. Once ashore, 
each regiment was authorized to fire up to 50 percent of its daily 
authorized ammunition allocation. Any firing beyond the 50 percent 
amount required the approval of the c r a .32 For the first six days 
of operations, the 25-pounders were authorized to fire 63 rounds 
per gun, per day while the medium guns were authorized 50. After 
six days that number was halved.33 Despite these planning figures,
27 HQ RCA 1st Cdn Div, Operation Order No.1, 5.
28 HQ RCA 1st Cdn Div, Operation Order No.1, 5.
29 WD, 1 RCHA, 13 July 1943.
30 HQ RCA 1st Cdn Div, Operation Order No.1, 6.
31 HQ RCA 1st Cdn Div, Operation Order No.1, 6.
32 HQ RCA 1st Cdn Div, Operation Order No.1, 9.
33 HQ RCA 1st Cdn Div, Operation Order No.1, 27.
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as it became harder to overcome German defences, the amount of 
ammunition that was expended increased exponentially.
The allocation of artillery observers to the assaulting brigades 
followed normal protocol, with the exception of the establishment of a 
Bombardment Unit of eight Ships’ Forward Observation Officer (f o o ) 
Parties that were created from the existing artillery f o o  parties. These 
units were attached to each of the four assault battalions, the two 
Royal Marines commandos (40 and 41 Commando) and the reserve 
brigade.34 The f o o s  of the Bombardment Units had received special 
training at the Combined Operations Training Centre in Scotland 
prior to the invasion. The parties were a mix of regular artillery and 
naval personnel with additional radio equipment to allow them to 
communicate with the fire support vessels.35 These f o o s  would often 
operate well ahead of the infantry battalions they were supporting. 
In one instance, George “Duff” Mitchell, assigned to the Princess 
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (p p c l i ), was provided with a Bren 
carrier and a small protection party.36 Mitchell experienced difficulty 
with communications using the notorious No.18 Set radio, so he was 
very happy to have the more dependable No.22 Set that came with 
the Bren carrier. The No.22 Set enabled his signaller to establish 
communications with the h m s  Delhi from which he directed a short 
barrage at the town of Ispica.37
The Delhi was just one vessel of a large armada that provided 
naval fire support during the amphibious assault. Warships on call in 
the Canadian area of operations included two monitors, five gunboats, 
nine landing craft gun (large), six landing craft tank (rocket), and 
eight landing craft flak.38 Particularly effective were the massive 
15-inch guns of the monitor h m s  Roberts.39 The pulverizing fire of 
the Roberts’ 879-kilogram shells facilitated the quick and efficient 
capture of the towns of Ispica, Modica and Ragusa. It was from 
Roberts that the c r a , who had left the headquarters ship Hilary,
34 HQ RCA 1st Cdn Div, Operation Order No.1, 8.
35 George (Duff) Mitchell, interview by Quiller Graham, 28 November 2000, 
Canadian War Museum Oral History Project, 31D Mitchell 1, Ottawa, ON.
36 Mitchell interview.
37 Mitchell interview.
38 Directorate of History and Heritage, Canadian Military Headquarters [CMHQ] 
Report 126: Canadian Operations in Sicily, July-August 1943: Part I: The 
Preliminaries of Operation Husky, 23, <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh- 
dhp/his/rep-rap/cmhqrd-drqgmc-eng.asp?txtType=2&RfId=126>.
39 Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, Vol.II, 140.
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directed the bombardment of the Sicilian littoral as the assaulting 
troops moved inland.40 The first shore bombardment by this vessel 
occurred at 1530 hours on 10 July in the vicinity of Ispica. The war 
diary dryly describes the fire as simply “effective.”41
The landings were generally unopposed but did not go smoothly 
for the artillery. A  storm passed through the area on 9 July resulting 
in high seas. The roiling surf posed a number of challenges for the 
gunners waiting to disembark. The 2nd Field Regiment’s war diarist 
recalled that “a feeling of excitement prevailed among the troops 
except the few who were seasick.”42
In accordance with the plan, the first artillery elements landed 
were the self-propelled guns of the Devons who reported themselves 
established ashore at 1730 hours.43 The Devons even captured 300 
Italian prisoners of war their first day ashore.44 The Divisional Artillery 
Headquarters landed on 11 July, moved north on the morning of 12 
July, but suffered immensely in mobility due to its lack of vehicles. 
As the headquarters staff moved out, a flight of six German aircraft 
strafed its column. Gunner Howard Schultz, on loan to the Divisional 
Artillery Headquarters from the 1st Field Regiment, r c h a  was killed 
and became the first fatal Canadian gunner casualty in Sicily.
Early on 11 July the troops of the 3rd Field Regiment assembled 
on the decks of their ship at 0230 hours and then waited for two 
to three hours before finally boarding a landing craft.45 Once they 
reached the shore, the troops moved inland on foot to assembly areas, 
where they awaited the arrival of their guns and vehicles. The logic of 
employing a self-propelled regiment in support of the assault brigades 
became evident when many of the towed-artillery’s Quads became 
stuck in the loose sand and had to be towed to firm ground.46
All of the guns and vehicles of 2nd and 3rd Regiments, r c a  had 
been delivered on shore by 11 July.47 Once the artillery began its
40 WD, 1st Cdn Div Arty, 10 July 1943.
41 WD, 1st Cdn Div Arty, 10 July 1943.
42 WD, 2nd Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery [2 RCA], 9 July 1943.
43 WD, 1st Cdn Div Arty, 10 July 1943.
44 Directorate of History and Heritage, CMHQ Report 127: Canadian Operations in 
Sicily, July-August 1943: Part II: The Execution of the Operation by 1 Cdn Inf Div. 
Section 1: The Assault and Initial Penetration Inland, 10, <http: / / www.cmp-cpm.forces. 
gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/cmhqrd-drqgmc-eng.asp?txtType=2&RfId=127>.
45 w D, 3 RCA, 10 July 1943.
46 WD, 2 RCA, 10 July 1943.
47 WD, 1st Cdn Div Arty, 11-12 July 1943.
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move inland, the towed 25-pounder howitzers had a difficult time 
moving on the goat-trails that passed for roads in southern Sicily. 
This would be a constant theme throughout the Sicilian campaign, 
and mobility was a particular problem for the 3rd Field Regiment 
which had lost so many vehicles to the U-boat attack. The 3rd Field 
Regiment tried a number of schemes to overcome its equipment 
shortages. On 11 July the regiment took control of four Italian 4.5- 
inch howitzers complete with horses, harnesses, ammunition and 
wagons. Although the regimental sergeant-major made a valiant 
attempt to press these assets into service, in the end the scheme was 
abandoned as the rate of advance was too slow and the gunners who 
“volunteered” as horse drivers complained of saddle sores.48 Later, the 
3rd Regiment dispatched some personnel to try to augment the unit’s 
meagre transportation. The party returned with a Fiat passenger car 
that had been employed by the Italian Army, a 3-ton diesel truck, 
and another early vintage Fiat passenger car.49 These vehicles gave 
the 3rd Field Regiment a rather motley appearance, but the gunners’ 
commitment to execute their mission is commendable. The 3rd Field 
Regiment’s war diarist observed “how we move is a wonder to all of 
us. Men are hanging onto vehicles everywhere -  on the tops, on the 
sides, and the [Regiment] bears more resemblance to a circus than 
to a Regiment of Field Artillery.”50 This poor state of affairs led to 
the unit’s first casualty of the campaign. Lance-Sergeant Jack of 19 
Battery, while clinging to the top of a Quad, was knocked off by a 
wire strung across the road and subsequently crushed by the gun 
and limber being towed behind. The unfortunate lance-sergeant died 
before the medical officer could reach him.51
Jack’s death took place while the field artillery was rushing forward 
to try to keep within range of the rapidly withdrawing defenders. 
Naval gunfire was thus vital during the first days. In fact, the first 
“Canadian” rounds were fired on 12 July by the 142nd (Royal Devon 
Yeomanry) Regiment (s p ), r a  whose self-propelled guns had greater 
mobility on the precarious Sicilian roads. The capture of the town of 
Modica by the p p c l i  was facilitated by a 15-minute barrage by the
48 WD, 3 RCA, 11-12 July 1943.
49 WD, 3 RCA, 12 July 1943.
50 WD, 3 RCA, 12 July 1943.
51 WD, 3 RCA, 12 July 1943.
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Devon’s that expended 575 high explosive rounds.52 The 2nd and 3rd 
Field Regiments, r c a  did not fire their first rounds until 14 July, 
while 1st Field Regiment, r c h a  did not join the fight until 17 July.53 
The lack of engagement was less than satisfactory to the gunners of 
the 3rd Field Regiment. On 12 July the regiment’s diarist bemoaned 
that “to date the [Regiment] has not fired a shot!” and the next day, 
even more exasperated, he wrote “and we still haven’t fired a round 
from our guns. Will we ever catch up to the Italians?”54
What caused this rapid withdrawal in front of the Allied 
advance? Lee Windsor, in a recent publication, concluded that the 
hasty northward withdrawal was in fact the result of a pragmatic 
appreciation. When it became clear that the Allies would attempt 
a landing somewhere in the Mediterranean, the Axis powers faced 
a dilemma that is common to all armies on the defensive -  much to 
defend with insufficient forces.55 When the Allies landed on 10 July, 
the Axis only had sufficient local forces to strike at the Americans at 
Gela,56 and these counterattacks were broken by the 1st US Division 
as it moved inland. Hitler, however, was determined to hang on 
in Sicily, which he hoped would prevent Benito Mussolini’s fascist 
government from falling and thus keep the Italians in the war on 
the side of the Axis powers.57 Given the resources available and the 
terrain, the Axis powers decided to establish a defensive line running 
from San Stefano on the northern coast, south to Leonforte and 
then east to Catania, creating an L-shaped perimeter that would 
secure the northeast corner of Sicily.58 The apparent German and 
Italian fighting retreat was in reality a deliberate withdrawal to a 
more advantageous defensive position.
Thinking that the Axis powers were in retreat, Montgomery 
issued orders for Eighth Army to advance quickly to the north. The 
13th Corps pushed north towards the Catania plain, while 30th Corps 
moved northwest towards Vizzini. At the vanguard of the 30th Corps 
manoeuvre was an ad hoc armoured column known as Harpoon Force,
52 CMHQ Report 127, 17.
53 Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, Vol.II, 145-146.
54 WD, 3 RCA, 12-13 July 1943.
55 Lee Windsor, “The Eyes of All Fixed on Sicily, Canada’s Unexpected Victory, 
1943,” Canadian Military History 22, no.3 (Summer 2013): 9.
56 Windsor, “The Eyes of All,” 10.
57 Windsor, “The Eyes of All,” 13.
58 Windsor, “The Eyes of All,” 12.
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followed closely by the 51st Highland Division. Montgomery hoped 
these formations could move in behind the Axis forces opposing the 
1st US Division at Gela and cut them off, but unfortunately the 
30th Corps ran into elements of the Italian 54th Napoli Division 
and the 206th Costal Division supported by elements of the German 
Hermann Goering Division in Vizzini. What was intended to be a 
bold turning manoeuvre became a sharply contested affair.59
The fight for Vizzini was the first major firing programme 
undertaken primarily by the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery. 
The surprisingly difficult fight for Vizzini brought Montgomery to 
order Harpoon Force and 51st Highland Division to abandon the 
northwesterly thrust and turn north towards the Catania plain, while 
the US forces swung to the west. This left a sizeable gap between 
the British and American forces that needed to be filled, and the 1st 
Canadian Division was the only formation in position to do so.60
VALGUARNERA AND BEYOND
To fill the gap between the Seventh US and Eighth British Armies, 
the 1st Canadian Division was ordered to move towards the town 
of Enna. En route, the division ran into a rearguard force in Piazza 
Armerina which held them up for nine hours. The Canadians had 
run into the eastern flank of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division 
who had established a defensive position to the south and west of 
Enna in an effort to buy time for the 12th Italian Corps to move 
into the northern branch of the defensive line from San Stefano to 
Leonforte.61 After the Axis forces withdrew, the Canadians advanced 
to the area of Valguarnera, where the enemy had dug in along high 
ground with excellent command of the Catania plain. Assuming the 
enemy they encountered were withdrawing elements of the Herman 
Goering Division, 1st Canadian Division made a quick assault from 
the line of march. This initial attempt failed, and, on 18 July, the 
Canadians launched their first two-brigade assault on a road junction 
near the town of Valguarnera.
59 Windsor, “The Eyes of All,” 13.
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The battle for Valguarnera represented a transformation of the 
Sicilian campaign from a rapid advance behind a withdrawing foe 
to a gritty struggle against a determined enemy dug in amongst the 
rocky hills.62 The Canadians had in fact run into the hinge of the 
defensive line where the Axis forces intended to hold the northeast 
corner of the island. The Canadian divisional artillery now played a 
sustained part in the combat operations.
The fire plan to support the attack on Valguarnera included all 
of the regiments of the divisional artillery, less the 142nd (Royal 
Devon Yeomanry) Regiment, r a  but augmented by fire from the 
7th Medium Regiment, r a . The c r a ’s  fire plan called for 68 rounds 
per gun to be fired, for a total of 5,984 shells.63 This was the first 
Canadian concentrated divisional fire mission in combat since the 
First World War. After bitter fighting, the attack succeeded in 
ejecting the German defenders from the road junction and seizing the 
town of Valguarnera.
LEONFORTE/ ASSORO
The Canadians encountered similar resistance to the east in the 
Catania plain. Montgomery’s plan for a dash up the east coast to 
Messina was not coming to fruition. In a bit of classical British 
understatement he described the increasing enemy resistance as 
making things a “bit slow and sticky on the right.”64 While the 1st 
Canadian Division was fighting around Valguarnera, the Germans 
counterattacked the 13th Corps on the Catania Plain and in the 
west ; the Americans who had swung wide to clear as far north as 
Palermo, were still a week away from closing with the enemy to the 
north. The only formation that had any potential to strike at a weak 
point was the 1st Canadian Division.65 As a result the Canadians 
were tasked to advance north to Leonforte and then move east into 
the flank of the Germans, hopefully relieving the pressure on the 
Catania plain.
62 CMHQ Report 127, 28.
63 WD, 1 RCHA, 18 July 1943.
64 General Bernard Montgomery quoted by C.P. Stacey in The Canadian Army 
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The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment (“Hasty P ’s”) were 
tasked to seize the town of Assoro on the high ground to the east 
of Leonforte. This manoeuvre aimed to support a later assault on 
Leonforte by the 3rd Canadian Brigade. During the night of 20/21 
July, the Hasty P ’s conducted a daring night-time ascent up a cliff 
face and surprised the German garrison that occupied the ruins of 
a Norman-era fort atop the hill. The Hasty P ’s coup de main has 
attained legendary status, due in no small part to the participation 
of eminent Canadian author Farley Mowat, who was an officer of the 
unit. Less well-known, however, is the four-hour harassing fire plan 
directed onto the road between Leonforte and Assoro that effectively 
distracted the German defenders.66
The initial attempt to take Leonforte by 3rd Brigade ended in 
failure. It involved no fire support and was a poorly planned attempt 
to seize Leonforte in daylight.67 For the second attack on Leonforte, 
Simonds employed the entire divisional artillery, reinforced by flanking 
artillery units for the heaviest Canadian barrage of the campaign up 
to that point. The intent of the barrage was to level the town of 
Leonforte.68 The barrage, complemented by excellent counter-battery 
fire directed from the heights of Assoro by a Hasty P officer who 
had previously served in the artillery, allowed 3rd Brigade to secure 
Leonforte. The efficacy of the massive barrage became apparent 
several days later when the 2nd Field Regiment moved through the 
Leonforte/Assoro area and noted in its war diary that the town was 
completely ruined and the air was heavy with the odour of decayed flesh.69
As the British divisions in the east had to build up supplies for 
their own renewed offensive Operation Hardgate, which began just 
before midnight of 29-30 July, the 1st Canadian Division became the 
main effort of Fifteenth Army Group.70 Once Leonforte and Assoro 
were in Canadian hands, the division began an eastward move 
toward the town of Agira in order to attack the flank of the German 
defensive line on the Catania plain.71
66 WD, 1st Cdn Div Arty, 20 July 1943.
67 Zuehlke, Operation Husky, 271.
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AGIRA
Simonds ordered an advance by 1st Canadian Brigade, led by the 
Royal Canadian Regiment and the 48th Highlanders, from the 
Leonforte/Assoro area eastward eight miles to the mountain-top 
town of Agira. Until this point, the Axis forces had been deployed in 
dispersed strong points. As they withdrew eastward under pressure 
from the 1st Canadian Division, however, they benefitted from 
contracting interior lines of communication and were able to deploy 
into mutually supporting defensive positions.72
The attack was to commence at 1500 hours on 24 July. Simonds 
knew that it would require a prodigious amount of firepower to dislodge 
the defenders. The fire plan for the attack was conducted under the 
supervision of no less than the commander corps royal artillery (c c r a ) 
of 30th Corps. The c c r a  met with all of the commanding officers of 
the Canadian divisional artillery at the latter’s headquarters on the 
morning of 24 July to coordinate the fire support plan. The fire plan 
consisted of a rolling barrage provided by seven regiments -  those of 
1st Canadian Divisional Artillery reinforced by 142nd (Royal Devon 
Yeomanry) (s p ), r a , the 16th Field Regiment, r a , and the 7th and 
64th Medium Regiments, r a  from 30th Corps’ 5th a g r a . In addition 
to artillery fire support, the division also received support from the 
tactical and strategic air forces. During the fire plan conference, the 
c c r a  advised the artillery commanders that they would be witness 
to the first example of cooperation between heavy bombers and land 
forces, as the fire plan would include six squadrons of medium and 
heavy bombers based in Malta.73
The complex fire plan included a number of moving pieces. In 
order to help coordinate the air support, the 1st Field Regiment fired 
a smoke screen 1000 metres ahead of the attacking infantry, beyond 
which the air force was free to bomb targets of opportunity.74 Ahead 
of the advancing infantry, a creeping barrage fired by the remaining 
artillery units attempted to suppress the German defenders while 
the assaulting battalions closed with them.75 Unfortunately, the rigid 
schedule of the fire plan meant the barrage, which rolled forward in
72 Windsor, “The Eyes of All,” 27.
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accordance with its timed programme, passed on when the infantry 
were held up by enemy fire, thereby squandering its neutralization 
effects. The 1st Canadian Brigade made three attempts to move 
through the intervening town of Nissoria towards Agira, but in each 
case the lead battalion was beaten back. Tragedy was narrowly 
averted when the Divisional Artillery Headquarters issued orders for 
the commanding officer of the 3rd Field Regiment to rendezvous 
with the c r a , and transmitted the incorrect coordinates, which sent 
the commanding officer and his intelligence officer into the as-yet 
unsecured Nissoria. The two officers spent an “exceedingly unpleasant 
hour in Nissoria awaiting the c r a ” before the error was realized and 
the two made a hasty withdrawal to the heights of Assoro, the true 
site of the meeting.76
The task of securing Agira passed from the tired 1st Brigade to 
the 2nd Brigade. The c r a  and artillery commanding officers met 
with Simonds at an observation post atop Assoro.77 All reinforcing 
regiments but 7th (Medium) Regiment, r a  had been clawed back by 
the c c r a  of 30th Corps, so the number of rounds to be fired was 
increased to 139 rounds per gun.78 The second fire plan opened with 
a 17-minute barrage on the opening line. The barrage would then be 
lifted and move eastward in 28 successive steps, advancing 100 yards 
every 3 minutes.79
It is important to recognize the extraordinary efforts of the Royal 
Canadian Army Service Corps. Although 139 rounds were called for 
in the fire plan, Simonds ordered 400 rounds-per-gun to be delivered 
to the gun positions.80 This required 150 trucks and drivers to haul 
the ammunition from the beaches under what the war diarist of the 
2nd Field Regiment described as “ [the] most adverse conditions.”81 
As over 500 trucks of the division were lost on the three ships that 
were sunk whilst en route to Sicily, the successful delivery of this 
ammunition was a signal achievement.82
Throughout the battle for Agira, the guns were pushed well 
forward, often deploying less than 3,000 yards from the forward
76 WD, 3 RCA, 25 Jul 1943.
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infantry forces. In the fluid battlespace of Sicily, the gun positions 
came under intermittent fire from enemy machine guns and heavy 
mortars. On one occasion a German sniper became active off the 
left flank of the 1st Field Regiment, r c h a , but withdrew after a 
patrol was dispatched from the guns.83 Despite these challenges, the 
fire plan to support the infantry past Nissoria was effective. The 
divisional artillery war diarist reported that 2nd Canadian Infantry 
Brigade:
made the attack under cover of barrage, which was reported by the 
infantry to be perfect. The barrage was so even and steady that the 
infantry closed right up on it and were on the enemy before they 
recovered from shock of barrage. Prisoners taken confirm this view. The 
objective ... was taken with very few casualties to our troops.84
Still, the day was not without tragedy. The 2nd Field Regiment, r c a  
was shelled by German artillery and suffered 13 casualties.85
The lead elements of the division now sat only three miles from 
the objective of Agira. Another push was planned by the 2nd Brigade 
which eventually moved to within a mile of the town with the support 
of harassing fire and concentrations by the artillery.86 A final push to 
move into the city was planned with another fire plan that called for 
nothing short of the complete destruction of Agira by indirect fire. 
Three hundred rounds were stockpiled at each gun position and at 
1200 hours the infantry on the outskirts of the town were ordered 
to withdraw.87 Minutes before the shelling commenced, an errant 
f o o , Captain G.E. Baxter from C Battery, 1st Field Regiment, r c h a  
supporting the p p c l i , accidentally wandered into Agira only to find 
that the enemy had departed. Fortunately for the town’s inhabitants, 
who crowded around Captain Baxter to celebrate their liberation, 
Agira was spared destruction.88
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REGALBUTO AND THE SALSO RIVER
The final chapter in the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery’s Sicilian 
story centres on the assault of the town of Regalbuto, seven miles 
east of Agira, tentatively scheduled for 30-31 July. With the 231st 
(Malta) Brigade under command, 1st Canadian Division seized the 
ridgeline south of the objective with a two-brigade attack conducted 
by the 231st and 1st Canadian Brigades, supported by an immense 
barrage of the three Canadian field regiments augmented by 165th 
Field Regiment, r a  and the 7th, 64th and 70th Medium Regiments, 
r a .89 Once the ridgeline south of Regalbuto was secured, the division 
prepared for a deliberate assault into the town behind another large 
barrage. Fortunately, as in the case with Agira, forward patrols 
found the town deserted of enemy and the fire plan was not required.
The division continued north along the Salso valley protecting 
30th Corps’ left flank. Divisional combat continued for almost 
another three weeks, but with the narrowing front created by the 
massive Mount Etna, the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery was not 
called upon to fire any large concentrations for the remainder of the 
campaign. Tragically, on the last day of the campaign an American 
B-25 Mitchell bomber was shot down and crashed into the 2nd Field 
Regiment’s command post, causing 29 casualties.89 0
CONCLUSION
This article provides a brief overview of the efforts of the 1st 
Canadian Divisional Artillery during the Sicilian Campaign. It 
demonstrates that historians have yet to explore this vital chapter in 
the campaign. Unfortunately, many of the existing histories on the 
Sicilian campaign lack an in-depth investigation into the artillery’s 
role within 1st Canadian Division. In this way, this work addresses 
a topic that will help paint a fuller picture of Canada’s role in Italy.
This article demonstrates that the 1st Canadian Divisional 
Artillery was thrust into a combat role with no combat experience, 
having recently emerged from a significant reformation in artillery 
organization and tactics. The Divisional Artillery conducted a
89 Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, Vol.II, 152.
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torturous maritime approach to the area of operations, suffering a 
severe loss of equipment and personnel to enemy action on the high 
seas. Once the Division came into contact with a highly trained 
enemy making the best use of Sicily’s topography, the artillery’s role 
became paramount. The infantry no longer operated beyond the 
range of the guns because their advance became bogged down by the 
withering machine gun, mortar and artillery fire of the defenders. As 
the Division ran into increasingly obstinate defences, the amount of 
artillery that was required to dislodge the enemy grew exponentially.
However, there was still much to learn. Despite the impressive 
amount of shelling conducted in the assault on Agira, the fire plan has 
been correctly criticized for its lack of flexibility. Likewise, the vast 
majority of rounds fired during the creeping barrages did not land 
anywhere near the enemy and had no neutralizing effect whatsoever. 
The evolution of fire support was a work in progress, and experience 
in Sicily was an important step in the development of a very effective 
artillery-based doctrine. As Terry Copp observes, “the artillery based 
doctrine ... has been widely criticized by historians for its rigidity 
... but it also suggests that the doctrine evolved out of the unique 
situation confronting the Allies in 1943-44: the necessity of attacking 
strong defensive positions with inferior armour and infantry weapons.”91
The gunners who fought their way through Sicily have a story that 
requires greater attention. They faced many hardships throughout the 
campaign but nonetheless persevered. In the end, they helped to develop 
the war-winning artillery formula that would allow the Canadian Army 
to successfully fight its way through Italy and Northwest Europe.
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